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How Can Behavioral 










Over the last 30 years a number of theoretical and empirical ad-
vances have emerged in the study of how the risk of injury in the work-
place influences labor market transactions. Economists have focused 
particular attention on mechanisms that compensate individuals for 
risk, primarily higher wages or workers’ compensation benefits, and 
how these compensation mechanisms influence the level of workplace 
safety. These issues have not only been the focus of considerable at-
tention by academics, but have also been applied to important public 
policy issues such as evaluating the benefits of safety programs and 
determining the optimal levels of workers’ compensation benefits.
As with most applications of economic theory, however, a number 
of these results have relied on very specific assumptions about the ways 
in which individuals obtain and use information about risk. Informa-
tion plays a critical role in economic theory. While economists have 
studied the role of information asymmetries in great detail, they have 
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paid less attention to how individual agents accumulate information 
and implement it in decision making. The standard economic model is 
one in which people process information perfectly, fully comprehend-
ing (and using) all information available to them. Gradually, however, 
economists have become increasingly interested in deviations from the 
perfect rationality model, particularly with regard to the processing of 
information about risk and uncertainty. We refer to the study of this is-
sue broadly as behavioral economics.
For obvious reasons, the ability of individuals to accumulate and 
process information about risk is particularly important for economists 
studying occupational safety and health. If we fail to properly model 
the ways in which individuals perceive, value, and respond to risk, it is 
unlikely that we will be able to accurately predict behavioral responses 
to changes in the risk of workplace injuries. This has important implica-
tions not only for economic research, but also for policies designed to 
promote workplace safety.
The objective of this chapter is to both explore how past research 
in the economics of occupational safety has dealt with deviations from 
the perfect rationality model, and to ask how the standard predictions 
change when we incorporate some of the key results of behavioral eco-
nomics. Economists since Adam Smith have recognized that deviations 
from the perfect rationality model would influence the way individuals 
respond to occupational risk. However, most recent studies use the ba-
sic framework from the standard perfect rationality model and study the 
effect of introducing a relatively small perturbation to the model, almost 
always by adding a subjective probability function that underestimates 
the true risk of occupational injuries. We attempt to incorporate some 
of the richer and more complex elements of behavioral economics into 
the analysis in the hopes of isolating some areas where current research 
might provide either misleading or incomplete conclusions about the 
role of occupational risk in employment and safety decisions.
Before proceeding we would like to note that this chapter is intend-
ed to be suggestive, and we do not presume to provide a comprehen-
sive integration of behavioral economics with the economic analysis of 
workplace safety. Both fields are vast and complex, and we focus our 
attention on just a small sample of the possible set of issues. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the issues we focus on are important and illustrate 
both that occupational safety is a natural place to apply (at least some 
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of) the principles of behavioral economics, and that these principles can 
have a profound impact on our predictions. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we outline the standard 
model of occupational risk in an expected utility framework. We focus 
on two key issues from the economics literature: the existence of com-
pensating wage differentials for job risk, and the relationship between 
workers’ compensation benefits and workplace safety. Our discussion 
focuses on the derivation of the main results in the perfect rationality 
model and some of the empirical evidence. In the third section, we then 
review some basic principles of behavioral economics. Our goal with 
this section is to summarize some of the evidence on how individu-
als perceive, value, and respond to risk differently than in the standard 
economic model. In the fourth section we discuss the extent to which 
the behavioral model alters the predictions of the standard model. In the 
fifth section we discuss the possibility that employers might be subject 
to some of the same behavioral phenomena that affect workers, and we 
discuss how this could influence the predictions of the model. The sixth 
section then draws out some of the policy implications from our inte-
grated model, and the final section concludes with recommendations 
for future research.
THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION
In this section we outline some of the basic results that have been 
obtained from applying economic analysis to workplace safety. We fo-
cus our analysis on two central topics that have been studied in the 
literature: the existence of compensating wage differentials for job risk, 
and the relationship between the insurance for occupational injuries and 
the level of workplace safety. These topics are particularly useful for 
our purposes because they comprise many of the most important results 
in the field and, as we demonstrate later on, because they are sensitive 
to assumptions about how individuals perceive, value, and respond to 
risk.
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Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Adam Smith first introduced the concept of compensating differ-
entials for job risks in An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. Smith (1937) argued that individuals faced with two 
identical jobs would, all other things equal, require more compensation 
to accept the job that involved a higher risk of personal injury or illness. 
Nearly 200 years later, Rosen (1974) formalized this intuitive notion 
and provided an empirical methodology to estimate the implicit “price” 
that workers charge for bearing the risk of injury on the job. Rosen’s 
work spawned a large literature dedicated to estimating this price using 
labor market data.
The intuition behind the empirical methodology is straightforward. 
Consider the empirical model relating individual wages to job charac-
teristics:
 
(9.1)  wi = δ + Xiβ + Ziζ + αqi + εi  ,
 
where wi represents the wage offer w for worker i, X represents a vector 
of individual characteristics such as age, gender or education, Z repre-
sents a vector of characteristics of individual i’s job, q represents the 
probability of injury on the job and ε is a random, mean zero error term. 
Note that for simplicity we consider a single injury type here, but in 
practice the model has been extended to include vectors of both fatal 
and nonfatal risks.
For our purposes the chief parameter of interest in this regression 
equation is α, which represents the compensating wage differential. As-
suming that the parameter estimate of α is well identified (generally 
that α is uncorrelated with ε), then we can literally interpret it as the 
marginal increase in wages an individual would require to make him 
or her indifferent to a marginal increase in job risk. This parameter is 
important, because in theory the price individuals charge to bear risk 
should be synonymous with their willingness to pay to reduce risk. The 
ability to estimate the willingness to pay to reduce risks is of critical 
importance for public policy, because this information is necessary if 
we wish to monetize the benefits of policies designed to increase safety. 
With the wealth of available data on individual wages, the estimation of 
compensating wage differentials for job risks has played a key role in 
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cost–benefit analysis for many environmental and health policies.
Numerous empirical studies have used Rosen’s approach to esti-
mate α, beginning with Thaler and Rosen (1976). In general, the empiri-
cal results have shown evidence of a compensating wage differential 
for fatal injury risk, but only mixed evidence of a wage differential for 
nonfatal injury risk (Viscusi 1993). A number of explanations have been 
posited for why the estimated differentials for nonfatal risks are difficult 
to estimate. From an empirical standpoint, the general problem is that 
the parameter of interest α might be negatively correlated with the er-
ror term ε, which causes a negative bias in estimates of α. The primary 
reasons for this suspected correlation presented in the literature are a 
confounding effect of workers’ compensation benefits, selection bias, 
and measurement error. 
A failure to include workers’ compensation benefits in the vector 
Z could bias α toward zero because these benefits reduce the expected 
cost of injuries, so workers with higher benefits demand a lower com-
pensating wage differential. To eliminate this bias, a number of studies 
have included a measure of workers’ compensation benefits and have 
increased the size of the estimated compensating wage differential (Vis-
cusi 1993).  
Selection bias can result because the level of job risk may be a 
choice variable for the worker. Individuals with a greater tolerance for 
risk might be more willing to accept employment at a risky job, a ten-
dency that would bias the compensating differential downward. Brown 
(1980) used a fixed-effects estimator to control for this selection and 
found little evidence of compensating differentials for job risk. Garen 
(1988) used an instrumental variables approach and found evidence of 
relatively large compensating differentials. Measurement error is one 
possible explanation for why Brown (1980) found no evidence of com-
pensating differentials. Black and Kniesner (2003) found evidence of 
significant, nontrivial measurement error in published job-risk variables 
that was correlated with other observable variables, making it impos-
sible to consistently estimate compensating differentials with ordinary 
least squares.
These are all plausible explanations as to why it is difficult to es-
timate compensating wage differentials for nonfatal, or even fatal, job 
risks. However, each of these can be overcome given the appropriate 
econometric technique and the availability of instrumental variables. 
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Later, when we discuss compensating wage differentials in the context 
of behavioral economics, we will see how certain elements of the be-
havioral model will call into question our ability to obtain estimates that 
are meaningful for policy analysis.
Optimal Workers’ Compensation Benefits and Safety Incentives
In the United States, the primary relief for workers injured on the 
job comes from workers’ compensation. One of the key features of 
workers’ compensation is that it offers only partial compensation for 
workplace injuries. Whereas an individual with a valid cause of action 
suing for damages in the tort system would be eligible to recover full 
economic losses as well as noneconomic losses (pain and suffering), 
workers’ compensation provides only partial replacement for lost in-
come and no compensation for noneconomic losses. On the other hand, 
because individuals can recover damages regardless of whether or not 
there was negligence, compensation occurs with much greater frequen-
cy than it would in the tort system.
A common justification for the use of partial coverage in workers’ 
compensation is the potential impact of benefits on safety incentives. 
One facet of this argument supposes that individual workers have the 
ability to take precautions that reduce the risk of injury but are unob-
servable (or unverifiable) to employers. If workers can control the level 
of risk they face, and if safety precautions involve some cost, then no-
fault insurance will give workers the incentives to take fewer precau-
tions and thereby reduce the overall level of safety. By only providing 
partial income replacement, workers’ compensation benefits reduce 
any disincentive by workers to take care.1 It may also reduce employer 
efforts to oppose reporting of legitimate claims, because such efforts 
would yield greater savings (Chelius and Kavanaugh 1988; Azaroff, 
Levenstein, and Wegman 2002). Note that there are other dimensions 
of this problem that may be mitigated by partial insurance coverage 
that might have little or no direct impact on actual safety levels, such 
as fraudulent claiming or extending injury duration past the true recov-
ery period. In addition, workers’ compensation may lead employers to 
reduce safety precautions if they are imperfectly experience rated or if 
workers do not demand the “optimal” level of precautions (Rea 1981; 
Smith 1992).
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Worker safety precautions are not the only mechanism through 
which workers’ compensation can influence the risk of occupational 
illnesses or injuries. A natural argument against removing occupational 
injuries from the tort system and restricting compensation is that it will 
reduce the incentives of employers to invest in safety precautions that 
reduce the frequency and/or severity of occupational injuries.  Workers’ 
compensation provides incentives for employers to improve safety, as 
fewer and less severe injuries will result in lower benefit payments (and 
correspondingly, lower workers’ compensation insurance premiums).
The effect of workers’ compensation benefits on workplace safety 
is the subject of debate in the literature. Studies such as Krueger (1990) 
and Ruser (1993) generally find evidence in support of the notion that 
higher workers’ compensation benefits lead to higher injury rates (for a 
review of the literature see Butler 1994). Less evidence has been found 
to support the claim that firms respond to incentives to improve work-
place safety (see Roberts 2005). Later in this chapter, we explore how 
behavioral economics changes our predictions about the relationship 
between workers’ compensation and workplace safety, and ask if it of-
fers any guidelines for public policy.
THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY
In this section we briefly review how behavioral scientists have 
thought about decision making under uncertainty, with a particular eye 
for the decision elements relevant for the study of occupational safety. 
We focus much of our discussion, at least in a broad sense, on the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky, which has exposed some critical assump-
tions that have led economists traditionally to mischaracterize human 
behavior (Rabin 2003). Specifically, we utilize the framework of pros-
pect theory, introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
One of the most important contributions of behavioral economics 
is to demonstrate that people make predictable judgment errors when 
faced with uncertainty (Rabin 2003).2 Individuals frequently employ 
rule-based, decision making techniques when they cannot calculate the 
costs and benefits of a choice. People may lack the time or the ana-
lytic skills necessary for the evaluation. For some, the dearth of cru-
226 Seabury et al.
cial information regarding the choice, such as objective probabilities 
and outcome values, hinders the rational decision-making process. For 
others, the dizzying array of information simply overwhelms. The fre-
quent practice of substituting heuristics, or cognitive rules of thumb, for 
structured analysis helps to explain why normative theory tends to fall 
short of reality. It also demonstrates the importance of considering the 
bounds to human rational decision making.
Prospect theory provides a systematic methodology for reconciling 
individual decision making with some of these errors. As a descriptive 
theory of choice, prospect theory illustrates decision making under risk 
as a selection among particular gambles or prospects. It distinguishes 
between two stages of the decision making process: an editing phase 
in which an individual organizes the problem into a choice between 
changes in wealth (or utility), and a choice phase in which the indi-
vidual chooses whichever outcome has the highest value. In this section 
we discuss how individuals might “edit” the problems associated with 
job risk. In particular, we focus on three aspects of the problem where 
this editing is of key importance: the perception of risk, the valuation 
of risk, and the response to risk. In the next section we then consider 
how these edited problems produce results that are different from the 
classical model.
Before moving on, we identify some subtle differences in what 
we mean by “risk” in these three aspects of individual behavior. When 
we discuss how individuals perceive risks we are generally referring 
to their perception of the probability of an injury or illness occurring. 
When discussing how individuals value risk we are talking more about 
the magnitude of the loss in utility individuals face if an injury or ill-
ness occurs. Finally, when we discuss how individuals respond to risk 
we refer to the behavior of individuals in response to the probability of 
an injury, the size of the loss, or, most often, the expected value of the 
loss.
How Do Individuals Perceive Risks?
In this section we are interested in the ways in which individuals 
perceive risks to health. Perhaps the most important question is whether 
or not individuals perceive risks accurately, i.e., does an individual’s 
subjective assessment about the likelihood of some adverse event oc-
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curring equal the “true” likelihood on average. Evidence supports the 
notion that individuals do not perceive risk accurately, and has led be-
haviorists to identify a number of cognitive biases that disturb an indi-
vidual’s information processing about risk. Below we discuss three of 
these biases that we feel are most relevant to the study of occupational 
risk: the availability bias, the optimism bias and the accumulation bias. 
We review the empirical evidence on each of these biases as they per-
tain to the workplace if such evidence is sufficiently available, and to 
health risks more generally if it is not.
The availability bias
Biased predictive judgments and subjective probabilities frequently 
result from the common use of the availability bias. Humans tend to 
judge the likelihood of an event by its ease of recall: we tend to dis-
proportionately weigh salient and memorable events even when bet-
ter sources of information exist (Rabin 2003). To illustrate, consider 
the fact that a substantial number of people have avoided flying since 
the 9-11 terrorism attacks but continue to drive at high speeds on the 
nation’s highways, where physical injury is far more likely to occur. 
Additionally, we observe that people tend to be overly influenced by 
friends’ remarkable mishaps with certain car brands, ignoring the em-
pirical evidence readily available from publications such as Consumer 
Reports (Rabin 2003). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) further illustrate 
this phenomenon as follows: 
The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective 
assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These 
judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are pro-
cessed according to heuristic rules. For example, the apparent dis-
tance of an object is determined in part by its clarity. The more 
sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This rule 
has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant 
objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the re-
liance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of 
distance. Specifically, distances are often overestimated when vis-
ibility is poor because the contours of objects are blurred. On the 
other hand, distances are underestimated when visibility is good 
because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity 
as an indication of distance leads to common biases. Such biases 
are also found in the intuitive judgment of probability.
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While some workers demonstrate a fairly accurate perception of 
risk (for example, see Ostberg 1980; Singleton, Hicks, and Hirsch 
1981), empirical studies provide some evidence of workers’ reliance 
on availability for occupational risk perceptions. For instance, in his 
survey of 915 workers on eight Norwegian oil rig platforms, Rundmo 
(1992) found that people most frequently perceived risk in connection 
with disasters and major accidents rather than with their routine tasks. 
This result also indicates the “flipside” of the availability bias—that 
workers may grow accustomed to their frequent and routine occupa-
tional dangers. In so doing, these risks may lose their “remarkableness” 
and are then underestimated as being “normal.” 
Organizational behavior scholars have provided us with substantial 
evidence of workers in familiar, highly risky work situations who un-
derestimate their risk levels in comparison to workers in unknown situ-
ations with comparable risk profiles (Mearns and Flin 1996). For exam-
ple, Zimolong (1985) found that workers in the construction industry 
typically overestimate the risks involved in tasks that they perform in-
frequently or do not understand fully, while commonly underestimating 
the risks involved in performing their routine tasks. In a subsequent 
study, Zimolong (1991) found that railway shunters, who are respon-
sible for coupling and uncoupling train cars, overestimate the risks for 
tasks that have a reputation for being dangerous and underestimate the 
risks involved with routine activities. Rundmo (1992) found similar re-
sults in his work concerning Norwegian oil rig personnel; workers fre-
quently perceived risk in connection with disasters and major accidents 
rather than in their common work responsibilities. 
The optimism bias 
Another form of bias that has commonly been demonstrated in per-
ception of risk is the optimism bias. The optimism bias simply states 
that people tend to underestimate their own injury risk compared to the 
average risk. Health behavior researchers have found that people gener-
ally think that they are less vulnerable to adverse health outcomes than 
the rest of the population. Specific examples appear frequently in the 
AIDS risk perception literature.
One such study focused on people’s comparative AIDS risk assess-
ments (van der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas 1994). The research-
ers surveyed four groups in Amsterdam, listed roughly in the order of 
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their increasing risk of contracting AIDS: a nationally representative 
sample (n = 437), heterosexuals with multiple private sex partners (n = 
241), homosexual men with multiple sex partners (n = 147), and het-
erosexuals with multiple prostitution partners (n = 493). They asked 
the participants to assess their personal risk (i.e., the likelihood that the 
subject himself or herself becomes infected) and average risk (i.e., the 
likelihood that a random person in their age group becomes infected). 
They found that people with more objective risk factors perceive them-
selves to be at greater risk. However, the subjects rated their personal 
risk substantially lower than that of others and were extremely optimis-
tic about their own chances of avoiding the virus (see Figure 9.1). 
A similar form of the optimism bias appears in workplace-related 
health risks. The more direct experience workers have with occupa-
tional hazards without adverse outcomes, the more confident they are 
in their ability to control the risk (Weyman, Clarke, and Cox 2003). For 
instance, a study of mine bunker operations reported that there was a 
“widespread faith in their ability to respond to dangerous incidents” 
(Rushworth et al. 1986). It thus appears that there is a kind of “Lake 
Woebegon” effect: when it comes to evaluating one’s own ability to 
avoid adverse health outcomes, everyone feels above average.
The accumulation bias
Other inaccurate risk perceptions result from the tendency of hu-
mans to form incomplete problem representations. Researchers have 



























SOURCE: van der Velde, van der Pligt and Hooykaas (1994).
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observed that people do tend to learn about risks in ways that change 
their original assessments of risk. In a study concerning 130 manufac-
turing workers, Cree and Kelloway (1997) found that accident history 
as well as perceptions of others’ commitment to health and safety were 
predictive of workers’ risk assessments. They also found these risk per-
ceptions related to the workers’ willingness to participate and turnover 
intentions. However, their risk perceptions may still fall short of the 
real level of exposure occurring in their workplace because of the ac-
cumulation bias.
People have the tendency to perceive risks “in isolation” rather than 
as a sequence of similar decisions or one that accumulates over a life-
time (Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 1993). Researchers have found 
that people typically do not perceive a difference between the likeli-
hood of injury occurring when a risky action is taken once versus the 
likelihood that ensues through multiple exposures. For example, people 
may understand that the chance of being injured in a car accident is 
about 1 in 10,000 each time they drive. However, they typically fail to 
realize that this statement is equivalent to a 33 percent probability of 
being in an injurious accident at least once during their lifetime (Slovic, 
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1978). 
Researchers have observed this tendency in a variety of psychology 
experiments related to health behaviors. Doyle (1997) found that people 
underestimate the cumulative risk of contraception use by failing to use 
the binomial probability model, where the probability of an unintended 
pregnancy is equal to 1 minus the probability of an intended pregnancy 
in one encounter raised to the number of sexual encounters. Likewise, 
Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) found that peoples’ risk esti-
mates for being infected with AIDS in more than 10 encounters were 
far too small when considering the risk they perceived in one encoun-
ter. Their subjects’ median risk perception of transmitting AIDS from a 
male to female when using a condom was 5 percent in one encounter, 
10 percent in 10 encounters, and 20 percent in 100 encounters. If the 
subjects had appropriately applied the binomial probability model, they 
would have argued that the risk was 40.1 percent in 10 encounters and 
99.4 percent in 100; these values differ with statistical significance.
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Summary
Here we have discussed three important biases about the ways in 
which people perceive risks. It is important to note that the biases are 
not mutually exclusive, and often work together. For instance, in the 
AIDS perception study by Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) it was 
found that individuals underestimate lifetime risk given their own esti-
mates of the risk from a single exposure. However, they found that in-
dividuals substantially overestimated both the single exposure risk and 
lifetime risk. This is easily explained by the availability bias; the risk of 
HIV infection is highly publicized and easy to recall, thus individuals 
tend to overestimate it. When taken in concert with the results of van 
der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas (1994), we can see how all three 
biases can be present with an individual’s perception of a single risk to 
health.
These misperceptions can influence individual behavior and poten-
tially lead to poor health decisions, including those precautions taken 
and protective equipment used to ensure occupational safety. For exam-
ple, workers may neglect to wear a mask in a dusty warehouse because 
the risk of developing asthma from a single day of inhaling pollutants 
is relatively low. On the other hand, Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 
(1993) found that individuals overestimate the ability of condoms to 
protect them from a sexually transmitted disease. This suggests that 
in some cases individuals may place too much faith in protective tech-
nologies, and may avoid other kinds of precautions that are necessary 
to minimize the risk of injury.
How Do Individuals Value Risks?
Prospect theory suggests that it is important not only to consider 
how individuals perceive risks, but also the ways individuals value risks. 
More precisely, it suggests that we should pay attention to the relative 
weights that individuals place on the gains and losses that are at stake. 
Standard economic theory predicts that people should value gains and 
losses symmetrically. In general, prospect theory suggests that this sym-
metry does not hold, particularly when the gains and losses are uncer-
tain. If true, this might cause us to not only change our predictions about 
behavior, but to change the way we interpret observed behavior.
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More specifically, individuals frequently display signs of loss aver-
sion, suggesting that they dislike losses more than they like gains of 
equal magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahne-
man 1991). While there are many implications of loss aversion, for our 
purposes we can illustrate the key concepts with the following hypo-
thetical scenario. Consider a risk averse individual who receives util-
ity from some good y according to the function U(y), where U is in-
creasing and concave. Now suppose the individual faces two lotteries: 
one (which we call A) in which she begins with y = 2,000 and faces a 
gain of 1,000 with probability 0.25, and the other (called B) in which 
she begins with y = 3,000 and faces a loss of 1,000 with probability 
0.25. In this example the expected utility for the lottery A is equal to 
0.75U(2,000) + 0.25U(3,000) and the expected utility for lottery B is 
equal to 0.75U(3,000) + 0.25U(2,000). It is a simple enough matter to 
show that the gain in expected utility from beginning with 2,000 and 
participating in lottery A is equal to the loss in expected utility from 
participating in lottery B.3 This is an important point, because expected 
utility theory implies that the amount individuals would be willing to 
pay to participate in lottery A should be equal to the amount they would 
pay to avoid lottery B.
As we have stated, we would not expect this symmetry to hold un-
der prospect theory. Prospect theory generally supposes that individu-
als evaluate changes based on gains and losses. Moreover, individuals 
evaluate these changes in welfare using a value function, which we de-
note V(·), that assigns a subjective value to a given gain or loss. Suppose 
we ignore the problems discussed in the previous section and assume 
that individuals perceive the probability of gain and loss accurately. If 
we let a = [U(3,000) − U(2,000)] and b = [U(2,000) − U(3,000)], we can 
define the value of lottery A as V(a) and the value of lottery B as V(b). 
Under expected utility theory, we would have V(a) = − V(b), but under 
prospect theory we expect that V(a) < − V(b). The subjective value that 
individuals place on a loss is greater than the value placed on an equiva-
lent gain. Thus, we can say that if individuals are loss averse, then the 
amount they would be willing to pay to participate in lottery A will be 
less than the amount they would pay to avoid lottery B.
We should note that the concept of loss aversion is distinct from 
the concept of risk aversion, which is fundamental to the neoclassi-
cal theory of insurance demand. Risk aversion essentially states that 
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individuals dislike risk, and will require a premium to accept a lottery 
with an uncertain outcome but the same expected value as one with a 
certain outcome. Mathematically, risk aversion is incorporated under 
the standard model through the assumption that the utility function, rep-
resented by U(y) is concave (so the marginal utility of income increases 
at a decreasing rate). Although the two concepts sound similar, they 
refer to two very different behavioral phenomena. Simply put, an indi-
vidual who is risk averse dislikes uncertainty, even uncertainty between 
two positive outcomes. Someone who is loss averse dislikes a shortfall, 
whether it occurs with certainty or not. In general, an individual can 
be loss averse and risk averse at the same time. However, an interest-
ing implication of loss aversion pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) is that loss averse individuals will be risk loving with respect to 
avoiding losses (in other words, they will prefer an uncertain loss to a 
certain one with identical expected value).
There is a great deal of experimental evidence to support the exis-
tence of loss aversion in individuals (e.g., see Knetsch 1989; Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; and Bateman et al. 1997). Most of the 
studies we are aware of focus on actual consumption goods, and have 
not established whether or not individuals are averse to losses of health. 
Nevertheless, the evidence supporting loss aversion in empirical studies 
is certainly strong enough to suggest that it is a phenomenon worthy of 
further study in the context of job-related health risks. As we shall see 
later on, the possibility that individuals are averse to health losses will 
have substantial implications for the economic analysis of workplace 
safety.
How Do Individuals Respond to Risk?
While the ways individuals perceive and value risks are important 
considerations for studying human behavior with regards to workplace 
injuries, in some sense they are both merely elements in the decision 
process that drives individual choices. McFadden (1999) defines a cog-
nitive process as “the mental mechanism that defines the cognitive task 
and the role of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes preferences and motives in 
performing this task, to produce a choice.” Therefore, we can think of 
risk perception and the value placed on risky options as specific compo-
nents in the larger problem of individual decision making. 
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Economists generally rely on the principle of utility maximiza-
tion as the cognitive process that drives behavior. Taking preferences 
as given, the economic model predicts that individual behavior can be 
well explained by a process by which individuals choose whatever al-
location of resources provides them with the highest overall benefit. 
While there can be no question that the utility maximization model has 
proved extremely useful and provided countless valuable insights into 
human behavior over the years, it has been criticized by behaviorists as 
ignoring many other important principles that influence behavior. This 
criticism is an important one for our purposes, because even if we make 
the right assumptions about subjective probability and subjective value 
we may still find it difficult to predict behavior if individuals do not 
respond to risk as assumed in the standard economic model. 
If individuals fail to (always) act as rational utility-maximizing 
agents, then what principles do we expect to govern the choices that 
they make? Prelec (1991) argues that individuals create decision rules 
to guide choices in cases where ordinary cost–benefit analysis is prob-
lematic. It is important to distinguish between these rules and the more 
common bounded rationality model. Prelec explicitly distinguishes 
rules that override cost–benefit analysis even when the analysis is rela-
tively straightforward from the rules associated with bounded rational-
ity, which are used exclusively when cost–benefit analysis is difficult 
and costly. For our purposes, bounded rationality would lead to similar 
results if the cost–benefit analyses associated with workplace safety de-
cisions are sufficiently complicated.
Prelec suggests three cases in which cost–benefit analysis might 
fail. The first case is that of a temporal mismatch, whereby individuals 
have difficulty assessing the net gain or loss of a particular action when 
its cost(s) and benefit(s) are separated by a substantial period of time. 
The second refers to a saliency mismatch, in which one of the pair (i.e., 
either the costs or the benefits) is vivid and easy to understand or imag-
ine while the other is vague or uncertain. The final case is that of a scale 
mismatch, in which either there is a large disparity between the costs 
and benefits or if one of them is only realized if the action is repeated 
many times. Prelec argues that cost–benefit analysis fails under each of 
these because it leads to an asymmetry in the weight assigned to either 
the cost or benefits associated with the action.4
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   235
Risks to health resulting from workplace injuries may be subject to 
any of the three mismatches that confound cost–benefit analysis. For 
example, determining the level of care to exert when using certain ma-
chinery that may pose a risk of loss of limb potentially suffers from the 
scale mismatch. The scale effect could arise because the cost of using 
a machine carefully is relatively small while the benefit of not suffer-
ing a loss of limb is large. Faced with the similar decision of whether 
or not to wear a seat belt, Prelec (1991) argues that individuals may 
develop a simple rule that governs use regardless of small permutations 
of the problem (such as whenever it rains or whenever driving on the 
highway).
The scale mismatch is only one example of how behavior related 
to workplace risks might be subject to these cost–benefit asymmetries. 
Repetitive stress disorders represent a set of common occupational in-
juries that may suffer from the temporal mismatch, given that they only 
develop over long periods of time. The saliency mismatch could arise 
in cases where workers felt financial pressure to take risk. Faced with 
the threat of job loss because of low productivity, for example, workers 
may take unsafe shortcuts or work too fast because the potential for job 
loss seems more “real” than the possibility of injury. These mismatch-
es need not be mutually exclusive; decisions relating to activities that 
might involve exposure to toxic chemicals potentially may be subject 
to all three mismatches (the cost of injuries are likely to be delayed, of 
unknown severity, and probably occur only after multiple exposures). 
In general, if individuals create rules that govern behavior with re-
gard to workplace activities that influence the likelihood of workplace 
injuries, then these rules will have several implications for the predic-
tions of the standard model laid out in the second section. We explore 
these implications in the following section. 
INTEGRATING THE STANDARD MODEL AND THE 
BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Here, we come back to the results of the standard model and ex-
amine how they are affected by the principles of behavioral econom-
ics. We follow the same outline as in the second section, focusing first 
on compensating wage differentials and then moving on to the optimal 
236 Seabury et al.
workers’ compensation benefits and levels of workplace safety. We con-
sider how the results of the behavioral model affect both the theoretical 
predictions of the standard model and the empirical studies estimating 
these predictions.
Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Generally speaking, integrating the principles of behavioral eco-
nomics with the standard model has relatively little impact on the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. The standard model states 
that workers will require higher compensation to accept employment 
in occupations associated with increased risk of workplace injuries or 
illnesses, ceteris paribus. In the behavioral model, we need only refine 
this statement to say that individuals will require higher compensation 
to accept employment in occupations in which there is perceived to be 
a greater likelihood of an injury or illness.
The distinction between actual and perceived risks is an important 
one. The standard economic model predicts that individuals will respond 
to the actual level of risk. Economists interested in workplace safety 
have generally understood that individuals may not perceive risks accu-
rately, however, and it is often assumed that individuals underestimate 
the risk of job injuries.5 This assumption seems widely supported by the 
empirical evidence on the availability bias, optimism bias and accumu-
lation bias discussed in the third section. Given that we expect workers 
to respond to the risks that they perceive, the size of the compensating 
wage differential they demand will be based upon the perceived risk as 
opposed to the actual risk. Importantly, as long as the perceived risk of 
injury is positively related to the actual risk, the compensating wage 
differential will still be positive.
As discussed in Viscusi (1993), if workers systematically under-
estimate the level of occupational risk, then they will demand a lower 
compensating wage differential. To see how this can matter empirically, 
consider Equation (9.1) on p. 222. In this setting the true job risk vari-
able q serves as a proxy for the perceived job risk, and the estimated 
parameter α represents the compensating wage differential multiplied 
by the correlation between the actual and perceived job risk. If workers 
underestimate the risk of job injury then the correlation between the 
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true and perceived levels of risk will be less than 1, implying a lower 
observed compensating wage differential.
The underestimation of risk may lead to a lower compensating 
wage differential than the standard model would predict, but loss aver-
sion will tend to have the opposite effect. To see this, consider that, 
according to prospect theory, individuals choose between different op-
tions by comparing the gains and losses associated with each. In the 
case of choosing an occupation, this would suggest workers compare 
the “gain” of staying healthy and receiving wages against the “loss” of 
being injured and receiving workers’ compensation benefits.6 If individ-
uals are loss averse, they will place additional weight on the loss from 
being injured relative to the gain from staying healthy and receiving the 
compensating wage differential. This suggests that if individuals are 
loss averse they will require extra compensation to accept higher levels 
of perceived risk than what is predicted by the standard model.
While the predictions of the behavioral model are fairly benign from 
a theoretical standpoint, they are problematic for the purposes of esti-
mation because they have opposite effects on the size of the differential. 
This makes it difficult to interpret differences in the estimated coeffi-
cient (α) for different kinds of risk. For instance, the fact that past stud-
ies have had relatively more success estimating positive compensating 
wage differentials for fatal risks than nonfatal risks is consistent with 
two behavioral explanations: 1) that individuals underestimate the risk 
of nonfatal injuries more than fatal injuries (which perhaps are overes-
timated), or 2) that the impact of loss aversion will be more severe with 
respect to fatal injuries than nonfatal ones (because clearly it makes 
sense to think of fatal injuries as involving a greater loss). While these 
explanations need not be mutually exclusive, they complicate matters 
by adding two more to the (already long) laundry list of items that po-
tentially confound the estimation of compensating wage differentials.
In some ways, the issues raised by the behavioral model pose great-
er challenges to obtaining meaningful compensating wage differential 
estimates than the standard criticisms. Measurement error and selec-
tion bias are statistical problems that can be addressed using standard 
econometric techniques, at least if the proper instrumental variables can 
be obtained. However, disentangling the estimated compensating wage 
differential from the impact of subjective evaluations of risk and loss 
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can only be accomplished by eliciting additional information from in-
dividuals.
While our discussion in this section has focused on wage differ-
entials, disability benefits represent an alternate means of compensat-
ing individuals for bearing risk. So, if we broaden our perspective to 
think about the implications of the behavioral model on the total injury 
compensation available to workers, we obtain similar results. Viscusi 
and Moore (1987) model the trade-off that workers implicitly accept 
between wages and workers’ compensation benefits as an increasing 
function of the level of risk. Individual behavior should be governed 
by perceived risk, so if workers underestimate the true level of risk 
then they will be willing to trade off less wages in return for benefits 
and thereby lower the optimal level of workers’ compensation benefits. 
On the other hand, if individuals are loss averse then they will place 
a greater weight on the possibility of a loss, which will increase their 
willingness to trade off wages for benefits at any given level of per-
ceived risk. Thus, elements of the behavioral model may lead to either a 
lower or higher optimal level of workers’ compensation benefits when 
compared to the standard model.
Worker learning
Before moving on to discuss the optimal workers’ compensation 
policy, it is worth considering the possibility that individuals learn to 
overcome their subjective evaluations as they gain experience. Viscusi 
(1979) hypothesizes that workers may be poorly informed about the 
level of risk at the start of their careers, but gradually learn about the 
level of risk over time. This suggests that the differences between the 
perceived probability of injury and the true probability may diminish 
over time, with workers possibly becoming perfectly informed with 
sufficient experience. If workers become more informed about risks, 
i.e., if they underestimate risk less, then workers with longer tenure in 
riskier jobs will demand higher compensating differentials or quit. Vari-
ous works broadly support this prediction, including Viscusi (1979) and 
Moore and Viscusi (1990).
Another possibility is that individuals become less loss averse over 
time, in the sense that their relative weights on gains and losses be-
come equalized as they gain experience. In a recent paper, List (2003) 
finds experimental evidence that individuals with more experience in 
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the market for trading cards tend to exhibit little or no evidence of loss 
aversion while those with less experience do. If this result held more 
generally to the case of workplace injuries it would suggest that work-
ers with longer tenure would place relatively less weight on the possible 
loss from injuries and therefore require less compensation. 
Thus, the effect of worker learning is to mitigate the impact of the 
behavioral model on the estimation of compensating wage differentials 
over time. Unfortunately, we know far too little about just how much 
workers actually learn over time to say with any certainty that this is 
the case. While the results of List (2003) are provocative, it is not clear 
ex ante whether or not individuals could learn to overcome aversion 
to health “losses” from injuries the same way they overcome aversion 
to income losses from trading goods. Additionally, while workers may 
become more informed about injury risk with experience, the availabil-
ity bias suggests that it is possible that as risks associated with familiar 
tasks become better understood, individuals may revise their risk per-
ceptions downward. Even if individuals do become more informed over 
time and their subjective risk assessments and loss valuations become 
“better,” the pace of learning may differ. This suggests that experience 
might have a nonmonotonic effect on the compensating differential, 
further complicating our ability to make predictions. Ultimately, a great 
deal of work needs to be done before we can understand the ways in 
which individuals learn about risk in the workplace.
Safety Incentives
The predictions of the behavioral model on the relationship be-
tween workers’ compensation benefits and safety incentives are varied 
and complex. Workers’ compensation benefits can affect the safety in-
centives of workers if, by reducing the financial burden of an accident, 
they make workers less cautious about avoiding accidents. Obviously 
loss aversion matters in this sense, because if individuals are loss averse 
then they will have more incentives to take care for a given level of ben-
efits, but they may also be more responsive to a change in benefits. This 
suggests that under loss aversion, individuals may be more responsive 
to changes in benefits than predicted by the standard model.
When talking about compensating wage differentials and workers’ 
compensation benefits we focused on how individuals perceive the level 
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of risk, but when considering safety incentives it is important to consid-
er how individuals perceive the way risks change as safety precautions 
change. Past studies such as Rea (1981) and Viscusi (1990) have gener-
ally assumed that the effect of precautions on perceived risk is directly 
related to the impact of precautions on actual risk. This suggests that if 
individuals underestimate the risk associated with workplace injuries, 
they will undervalue the marginal benefit of taking additional precau-
tions. If this is so, then individuals will underinvest in safety for any 
given level of workers’ compensation benefits. By extension, if benefits 
increase (decrease) then workers will generally respond by decreasing 
(increasing) precautions by more than what would be predicted in the 
standard model.
However, there are reasons to suspect that the relationship between 
safety precautions and perceived risk is not as straightforward as sug-
gested in the literature. The optimism bias and the aforementioned re-
sults of Weyman, Clarke, and Cox (2003) and Rushworth et al. (1986) 
suggest that individuals may overestimate their ability to control risks. 
This suggests that for any given level of benefits individuals will tend 
to be more cautious than predicted by the standard model. This sug-
gests a result opposite of the case discussed above; a change in workers’ 
compensation benefits would have less of an impact on worker safety 
precautions than the standard model predicts.7
The implications of individual perceptions of risk on safety are not 
exclusive to the safety precautions taken by individual workers. As we 
discuss later on, it is plausible to suppose that employers, at least large 
corporations, are less subject to some of the behavioral criticisms than 
individual agents. Nevertheless, worker perceptions of risk may have 
an impact on employer safety measures. Rea (1981) demonstrates that 
if individuals underestimate risk they will demand too few safety mea-
sures from employers. On the other hand, if workers place too much 
faith in protective technologies, as Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 
(1993) showed individuals tend to do with condoms, they may demand 
supraoptimal safety measures from employers.
Note that these different effects of the behavioral model on the 
level of safety measures taken assume that precautions are set as the 
result of an implicit cost–benefit analysis made by workers, even if their 
subjective evaluations of probability and loss differ from the standard 
model. However, we discussed earlier how workplace injuries may suf-
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   241
fer from the kinds of cognitive mismatches that Prelec (1991) argues 
can confound cost–benefit analyses. If this is so, workers may respond 
by implementing decision rules that govern the level of safety precau-
tions they take. If workers operate under decision rules such as “always 
wear safety goggles,” it is quite possible that relatively small changes 
in disability benefits will not be enough incentive to induce workers to 
change their safety precautions. Thus, in extreme cases the behavioral 
model may contend that there should be no relationship between safety 
levels and workers’ compensation benefits.8
DOES THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL APPLY TO EMPLOYERS?
Until now, all of our discussion has focused on applying the mod-
els of behavioral economics to workers. One question we have not ad-
dressed, and to our knowledge has not been addressed in the literature, 
is whether or not employers behave as the perfectly rational, perfectly 
informed economic agents they are supposed to be in the standard mod-
el. In this section we provide a brief discussion of how the behavioral 
model could be applied to employers and how this would change our 
predictions.
It is typical in economics to view employers, or firms more general-
ly, as impersonal entities that are motivated solely by maximizing prof-
its and share few of the behavioral nuances of individuals. For example, 
it is common to view employers as risk neutral while individual work-
ers (or other agents) are typically assumed to be risk averse.9 Likewise, 
models of occupational safety that incorporate risk misperceptions by 
individual workers typically assume that firms are fully informed about 
the true injury risk. There are a number of reasons that employers may 
behave more like the rational economic agents than individual workers. 
First, employers may have access to better data on the actual risk of in-
jury to employees. Also, it is not clear the extent to which the personal 
nature or risk influences individual behavior, and it is possible that em-
ployers would have a more accurate perception of risk because it did 
not directly affect them.
On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that employers may 
not perfectly fit the rational economic model. In general, large employ-
ers are probably most likely to be able to accurately predict the risk 
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of injury to an individual worker, simply because of the law of large 
numbers.10 Small employers will simply not have enough observations 
to accurately formulate a probability. Even if employers as organiza-
tions understand the true risk of injury to workers, they are still driven 
by the decision making of individuals. It seems reasonable to suspect 
that individual managers might be poorly informed about the risk of 
injury to workers, or suffer similar cognitive biases about risk as those 
discussed above.
Another factor that might mitigate some of the impact of employers’ 
risk misperceptions that will likely not be available to workers (even 
unionized ones) is the presence of insurance companies. Presumably, 
insurance companies have the knowledge and expertise to construct 
the most accurate estimates of the actual risk of injury for individuals. 
Thus, even if an employer does not place the appropriate marginal ben-
efit on safety precautions, the insurance company could provide finan-
cial incentives for safety through discounts in workers’ compensation 
premiums.11 
However, there are other ways that investment in workplace safety 
might enter a firm’s profit function than through premiums, such as the 
direct cost of investment, the impact of workplace safety on the expect-
ed marginal productivity of labor, and reductions in the compensating 
wage differential. Even if insurance companies can mitigate some of 
the impact of risk misperceptions, they likely won’t have much effect 
on the wage negotiations between workers and employers unless they 
are able to communicate the appropriate risk levels. Also, the ability of 
insurance companies to convey accurate risk information will be less 
for smaller firms that are not perfectly experience rated. And finally, 
there are some risks for which even insurance companies likely have 
trouble assessing accurately, such as catastrophic risks. In these special 
cases, which involve extreme losses but have uncertain probability, em-
ployers and workers may over- or underreact in a similar fashion.
If employers as whole, or individual managers within firms, deviate 
from the perfectly rational model in ways that are similar to individual 
workers, then our model would predict different behavior for them as 
well. Consider the case of compensating wage differentials. If employ-
ers underestimate the risk of injury to individual workers, we might ex-
pect that this would make them less willing to negotiate compensating 
wage differentials. However, note that injuries will affect the expected 
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   243
marginal productivity of labor, because injured workers are (at least 
temporarily) less productive than healthy ones. In this case, if employ-
ers underestimate the risk of injury it might lead them to overestimate 
the expected marginal productivity of labor (because more workers will 
be injured, and therefore be less productive, than expected by the em-
ployer). If employer misconceptions were positively correlated with the 
true injury risk, i.e., if they underestimated risk more in riskier jobs, this 
could lead to an upward bias of the compensating wage differential.12
Investment in workplace safety provisions will also be affected if 
employers deviate from the standard model. If employers underesti-
mate the risk of injury, they may thereby underestimate the marginal 
benefit of safety measures. If this is the case, it will lead employers to 
underinvest in safety. On the other hand, suppose that employers over-
estimated their ability to influence workplace safety measures. This will 
lead employers to “oversupply” workplace safety, meaning they will 
invest beyond the point where the true marginal benefit equals marginal 
cost. However, if employers underestimate their ability to influence risk 
they will tend to undersupply workplace safety provisions. Ultimately, 
the equilibrium level of safety will be a complex function depending on 
both the employer’s and the employee’s perceptions of risk as well as 
other fundamentals of the model.13
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The discussion in the previous two sections focused on the im-
plications of the behavioral model for research on the economics of 
workplace safety. However, just as this research has influenced public 
policy we believe that the issues we raise also have important policy 
implications. We focus our discussion on the two policy areas that are 
most closely related to our previous analysis: the use of compensating 
wage differentials to estimate the value of life, and policies designed to 
improve workplace safety.
Using Value-of-Life Estimates in Cost-Benefit Analysis
Government policies and regulations can often reduce the risk of 
fatal and nonfatal injuries to individuals, but sometimes only at substan-
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tial cost. In order to determine which policies are most cost-effective, it 
is necessary to have some estimate of the willingness to pay for a reduc-
tion in the level of risk. Compensating wage differential estimates can 
be used to provide an estimate of the “value-of-life,” allowing a com-
putation of the expected benefit of increased safety in terms of a dollar 
amount. The use of value-of-life estimates to evaluate public policies 
began in the 1980s and has become more widespread since (Viscusi 
1993). 
Obviously these estimates are only useful to the extent that we are 
able to identify them well empirically, and as we have discussed there 
are numerous problems to doing so. The criticisms that come from the 
behavioral model are different, however, in that they do not question the 
validity of the empirical predictions as much as they question how to 
use the predictions. Specifically, while the behavioral model does pre-
dict that the size of the estimated compensating wage differential may 
be different than predicted by the standard model, this is not the same 
as saying that the estimated differential is biased. Indeed, if we ignore 
the measurement error and selection issues, the estimated relationship 
between wages and actual job risk should be well identified. The com-
plication comes in interpreting the coefficient, because it will implicitly 
reflect the relationship between the actual risk and the individuals’ sub-
jective risk perceptions and valuations. This is particularly troubling if 
the value-of-life estimate is used to assess the cost and benefits of some 
policy designed to reduce a risk that is subject to different cognitive 
biases than job-related risk (such as a plane crash, the risk of which 
individuals overestimate).
In some sense, the key impact of the behavioral model on the use 
of value of life estimates is to highlight the need for additional data. 
We simply do not know enough about the ways workers (or employers) 
perceive, value, or respond to risk. Survey and experimental data that 
elicited this information for job-related health and income risks would 
not only increase our understanding of many of these issues, it would 
allow us to generalize and improve the policy usefulness of value-of-
life estimates based on labor market data.
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Promoting Safety in the Workplace
Workers’ compensation is generally thought to provide employers 
and workers with financial incentives to improve safety. While this may 
be true, the behavioral model questions the effectiveness of both our 
ability to predict how strong the safety incentives are and whether or 
not they will have much effect at all. However, workers’ compensation 
is certainly not the only public policy that deals with workplace safety. 
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
was founded in 1971 as a regulatory body to promote safer workplaces, 
and 24 states have their own health and safety plans that are approved 
and monitored by OSHA. Rather than rely (solely) on financial incen-
tives, these organizations rely on traditional regulatory measures such 
as inspection and enforcement of safety programs.
However, it needs to be determined in light of the behavioral criti-
cisms exactly what kinds of safety programs are most likely to be ef-
fective. Rea (1981) demonstrated that if individuals misperceive the 
risk of injuries they might respond to employer precautions in ways 
that mitigate the benefits of reduced risk. Moreover, if individual safety 
behavior is determined by rule-based decision making then it is difficult 
to predict how (if at all) individuals will respond not only to financial 
incentives but also to regulatory or programmatic incentives.
One important way to improve safety, or at least to improve the effi-
ciency of safety decisions, may be to provide information to workers.14 
We discussed above how experience and learning by individuals may 
allow them to overcome some of their cognitive biases about risk and 
act more like the rational economic agent. Of course, it often requires a 
substantial investment of time and effort to obtain and process informa-
tion. If there are economies of scale in acquiring information then we 
might expect firms to have an advantage in this regard, which would 
make them a more efficient mechanism to collect and process the rel-
evant data. More work needs to be done to say for sure, but it is possible 
that doing more to educate workers in risky positions, and perhaps the 
employers as well, would lead to more efficient long-run employment 
contracts between workers and employers.15 
Even if information cannot fully overcome workers’ or employers’ 
biases, it may be helpful in other ways. Suppose worker safety precau-
tions were governed by rules, but those rules were based on suboptimal 
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perceptions about risk. Thus, information may be able to help individu-
als switch to “better” rules that make them choose more efficient levels 
of precautions. All of this is highly speculative, but it does suggest that 
a better understanding of how individuals think about and respond to 
risk may allow us to come up with superior policies regarding work-
place safety. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have attempted to highlight some principles of 
behavioral economics and show how they can influence the economic 
analysis of occupational safety. Behavioral economics predicts that in 
some cases individuals will fail to perceive, value, or respond to risk as 
predicted in the standard economic model. We have shown that if the 
behavioral model holds it will at the very least greatly complicate the 
analysis of how individuals respond to the risk of workplace injuries, 
and in many cases the standard model might make misleading (if not 
actually false) predictions about behavior.
We fully acknowledge that our analysis raises many more questions 
than it answers. Economists generally make assumptions to simplify 
analysis, and the elements of behavioral economics we discuss add 
complication back to our model. Given this, it is probably not surpris-
ing that, when we consider the additional dimensions that might govern 
individual choices, we find that these dimensions often work in differ-
ent directions and restrict our ability to make clear predictions. That 
said, in many cases the general predictions of standard economic model 
hold, particularly with regard to compensating wage differentials. The 
strongest effect of the behavioral model seems to be to change our inter-
pretation of the results we find empirically, and often this interpretation 
cannot be made without more a priori information about how individu-
als actually perceive, value, or respond to risk.
Now we come to the place that many researchers arrive at—call-
ing for more research. In this case, it should be clear to the reader that 
we indeed know very little. Work is needed to disentangle the various 
behavioral predictions about the ways people cope with the risk of in-
juries and illnesses at work. Specifically, we need information not only 
on how individuals perceive the risk of injury in various occupations 
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but how these perceptions change over time and in response to worker 
and employer safety precautions. We need information about how in-
dividuals value the risk of injury relative to the way they value wages 
and higher compensation, and we also need to see how this valuation 
changes over time. We need to learn how individuals respond to per-
ceived risk, and how increased information changes those responses (if 
at all). This information is not readily available given current sources 
of data, but we feel that future experimental and observational studies 
that address these and related issues will greatly increase our ability to 
conduct research and inform meaningful policy pertaining to occupa-
tional safety.
Notes
We would like to thank Karen Roberts and seminar participants at the University of 
Rhode Island for helpful comments. We take full responsibility for any errors. All views 
presented in this paper are those of the authors, and should not be attributed to any in-
stitutions that they are affiliated with. 
 1.  It is worth noting that this argument is not necessary to justify the use of par-
tial insurance coverage. Basic insurance theory tells us that the optimal level of 
insurance will equalize the marginal utility of income in the “good” and “bad” 
states. Viscusi and Moore (1987) and Viscusi and Evans (1990) argue that the 
marginal utility of income is lower for individuals with disabling injuries, pos-
sibly because working becomes more difficult when one is disabled, and so the 
optimal insurance contract provides less than full coverage of economic losses.
 2.  The distinction between predictable and unpredictable errors in judgment is im-
portant. If individuals make predictable errors, this suggests that they (might) 
behave in a way different than that predicted by the standard economic model. 
If, on the other hand, errors are random, then the economic model should predict 
behavior accurately on average.
 3.  The difference is equal in absolute value to 0.25[U(3,000) − U(2,000)].
 4.  Note that in many cases these mismatches are related to the subjective assign-
ments of perception and value discussed previously. For example, the saliency 
mismatch is closely related to the availability bias, suggesting that individuals 
consistently place greater weight on situations or outcomes that are easily under-
stood. Likewise, a failure to place the appropriate weight on costs (or benefits) 
that occur only after multiple actions is similar to the availability bias, in which 
individuals appreciate the cumulative risk resulting from multiple exposures.
 5.  In addition to suggesting the existence of compensating wage differentials, 
Adam Smith (1776) also proposed that individuals underestimate risk, noticing 
the relatively small number of individuals who purchased fire insurance. Spence 
(1977) provided a formal model of how the underestimation of risk can lead in-
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dividuals to underinsure against the risk of product failure, and Diamond (1977) 
and Rea, Jr. (1981) examined how underestimating risk affects optimal workers’ 
compensation insurance (which we discuss more later). 
 6.  Presumably, the gain and loss is measured relative to some benchmark utility 
level that is received with certainty, i.e., the “reservation” utility level.
 7. Note that we are implicitly assuming here that there is no fixed safety level that 
workers are trying to obtain. If workers are maximizing expected utility with 
respect to safety precautions then they will set the marginal benefit equal to the 
marginal cost, which will lead to more precautions taken if they perceive a higher 
marginal reduction in risk. If, on the other hand, workers are trying to attain some 
fixed level of (perceived) safety then overestimating the productivity of safety 
precautions could lead to reduced precautions, because they can achieve this 
perceived level with fewer precautions.
 8.  As mentioned before, empirical evidence has demonstrated a relationship be-
tween workers’ compensation claims rates and workers’ compensation benefits. 
However, as we cannot rule out the possibility that this relationship is driven 
either by fraud or simply the efficient response by individuals to some unobserv-
able (to econometricians) costs of claim filing instead of some change in actual 
safety behavior, we cannot dismiss the possibility that actual workplace safety is 
unresponsive to benefit levels. 
 9.  The assumption of risk-neutral firms is generally justified by the notion that 
shareholders drive the behavior of firms. If this is true and shareholders are able 
to perfectly diversify assets, they will desire the managers of firms to maximize 
expected profits. While this assumption of risk neutrality might be valid for large 
firms, the notion of perfectly diversified shareholders is probably less meaning-
ful for small firms.
 10.  On the other hand, it is not clear why a large union would not have access to 
similar information, so it seems less likely that there would be a divergence be-
tween the risk perceptions of employers and organized labor.
 11.  In the long run, insurance premiums should be completely “passed on” to work-
ers in a perfectly competitive market. If wages are sticky, however, there will be 
short run costs to premiums that will influence firm behavior.
 12.  Note that if workers underestimated risk in a similar fashion as employers, they 
would demand less of a compensating differential in the same occupations that 
firms would be willing to offer higher wages. Thus, the net effect on the compen-
sating differential estimate would be ambiguous.
 13.  These other model primitives include such factors as the complimentarity of 
worker and employer safety precautions and differences in utility and marginal 
utility of income in the injured and health states.
 14.  It is important to distinguish efforts to increase safety from efforts to make the 
level of safety more efficient. Some of the predictions of the standard model ac-
tually predict that there might be too much safety relative to the standard model. 
In this case, it could be efficient to make people less careful.
 15.  Of course, we recognize that it is difficult to communicate risk information so 
that it is perceived accurately. 
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